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If in some smothering dreams you too could pace
Behind the wagon that we flung him in,
And watch the white eyes writhing in his face,
His hanging face, like a devil’s sick of sin;
If you could hear, at every jolt, the blood
Come gargling from the froth-corrupted lungs,
Obscene as cancer, bitter as the cud
Of vile, incurable sores on innocent tongues,
My friend, you would not tell with such high zest
To children ardent for some desperate glory,
The old Lie; Dulce et Decorum est
1
Pro patria mori.
—Wilfred Owen
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 21, 2013, a rocket attack in the Ghouta area of Damascus killed
numerous civilians and left many others wounded and complaining of a range of
2
symptoms, from shortness of breath to general disorientation. UN investigators
later confirmed that the shells from the attack contained the nerve agent sarin,
3
delivered in artillery rockets against a target area that included civilians.
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon denounced the attack as a “war crime,”
4
and the international community mobilized to take action —despite the fact that
5
Syria is not a party to either the Chemical Weapons Convention or the Biological
6
and Toxin Weapons Convention —because customary international law drawn
from the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare

1. Wilfred Owen, Dulce et Decorum Est (1917), available at http://www.warpoetry.co.uk/owen1.html.
Owen’s poem describes the horror of a gas attack as the troops in the trenches would have experienced it. He
died in battle seven days before the Armistice that ended World War I. Wilfred Owen, Greatest of the War
Poets Who Have Written in the English Language, THE WAR POETRY WEBSITE, http://www.warpoetry.co.uk/
owena.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
2. Syria Crisis: UN Report Confirms Sarin ‘War Crime,’ BBC NEWS (Sept. 16, 2013, 2:02 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24113553.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See Joshua Meir Freedman, Don’t Let Assad Sign the Chemical Weapons Convention on Syria’s
Behalf: Allowing Bashar al-Assad to Sign an International Treaty on Behalf of Syria, ALJAZEERA (Sept. 29,
2013), https://en-maktoob.news.yahoo.com/dont-let-assad-sign-chemical-weapons-convention-syrias-1447184
06.html.
6. See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and
Disarmament Agreements and Commitment, 17 (July 2014).
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(hereinafter “Geneva Protocol,” or “the Protocol”) forbids the use of chemical
7
weapons.
In 1925, the major global powers drafted the Geneva Protocol, a document
8
that, by 1970, had eighty-four nations that were parties to the treaty. The Geneva
Protocol forbade “the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and
of all analogous liquids, materials or devices,” a description that can be read to
9
cover nerve agents like sarin.
Just around two and a half months after the chemical attacks in Syria, the
United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments on a case that, on its surface,
bears no resemblance to the horrors of chemical warfare the civilians of
10
Damascus experienced. Carol Anne Bond, upon learning that her friend was
pregnant with her husband’s child, stole toxic chemicals from her workplace and
11
applied them to her friend’s doorknobs, car door handles, and mailbox. Bond’s
12
friend, Myrlinda Haynes, suffered minor burns from the chemicals. What would
appear to be a simple case of poisoning in fact transformed into a national debate
about the power of the Federal government to enact legislation that implements
13
treaties. Rather than charge Bond under state law, where the penalty would
range from three months to two years in prison, prosecutors charged Bond under
18 U.S.C.A. section 229, the statute implementing the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction (hereinafter “Chemical Weapons
14
Convention” or “CWC”), which carries much higher penalties. Sentenced to six
years in prison, Bond challenged the constitutionality of the statute, while the
Obama administration cautioned that any move by the Supreme Court to limit the
applicability of the statute enforcing the treaty at home could cause difficulties in
15
enforcement abroad. In part this is because prosecutors charged Bond under the

7. Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, Jun. 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65 (hereinafter “Geneva
Protocol”); R. R. Baxter & Thomas Buergenthal, Legal Aspects of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, 64 AM. J. INT’L
L. 853 (1970).
8. Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 7, at 854.
9. Geneva Protocol, supra, note 7.
10. Bond v. United States, THE OYEZ PROJECT AT IIT CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE OF LAW,
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2013/2013_12_158#bluebook (last visited Nov. 24, 2013). The case was
argued before the Supreme Court on November 5, 2013 and decided June 2, 2014.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Warren Richey, Is a Thumb Burn a Chemical Weapons Violation? Supreme Court Takes up Case,
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2013/1104/Isthumb-burn-a-chemical-weapons-violation-Supreme-Court-takes-up-case; 18 U.S.C.A. § 229 (1998).
15. Id.; The Supreme Court ruled in her favor, finding that it was unreasonable to interpret the phrase
“chemical weapon” to cover Bond’s actions, despite noting that the definition in the statute is broad enough to
encompass Bond’s actions. Bond v. United States, 134 S. CT. 2077 (2014). For an in-depth discussion of the
Bond case, see infra Part IV.B.
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statute implementing the same treaty that Syria agreed to sign after pressure from
16
the international community.
Clearly, the effects of a sarin gas attack and the minor burns that result from
touching corrosive chemicals left by a jealous rival are hardly on the same scale,
yet both implicated the Chemical Weapons Convention, a 1993 treaty that set out
to further codify the international prohibition on chemical weapons first set forth
17
in the Geneva Protocol. How is it possible to bring two such disparate examples
of chemical use under the same treaty?
The answer may lie in the phrasing of the treaty itself, which defines
chemical weapons as “Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where
intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types
18
and quantities are consistent with such purposes.” The breadth of chemicals
covered under such a definition therefore can be read to include both sarin gas
19
and the toxic chemicals Bond used against her rival.
The over-broad description of banned chemical weapons—first found in the
Geneva Protocol and carried over into subsequent treaties—coupled with the lack
20
of specific enforcement mechanisms, creates a situation where compliance is
dependent on general fear and international disapproval of the idea of chemical
weapons. Under-application of prohibitions on chemical weapons has the
potential to make the treaties meaningless, while over-application removes the
21
uncommon character of chemical weapons and the fear that prevents their use.
This Comment will begin by looking at the history of chemical weapons in
the modern era and the various prohibitions against them. This will provide a
description of the pattern of behavior that informs modern opinions on chemical
22
weapons and illustrate the origins of these fears. Part II will begin with a look at
the fin de siècle prohibitions that influenced World War I, and will then look at
23
the War and its impact on subsequent international agreements. Part III will
look at subsequent tests of Geneva and the development of additional agreements
16. Richey, supra note 14.
17. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, with Annexes,
Jan. 13, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 (1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45 (hereinafter “CWC”).
18. Id.
19. Richey, supra note 14; See also Bond,134 S.Ct. at 2095 (Scalia, J., concurring).
20. Geneva Protocol, supra, note 7; CWC, supra note 17, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45, art. II, XII. It should be
noted that the CWC does provide a schedule for destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons, and a
monitoring and enforcement body to do on-site inspections and investigations, but as three states have achieved
complete destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles and the United States has missed both its deadlines and
now projects a completion date of 2023, it is hard to argue that these mechanisms are overly effective. James
Lewis, Fact Sheet: Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction, CENTER FOR ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION (Feb. 4. 2014) http://armscontrolcenter.org/issues/biochem/fact_sheet_cw/.
21. See infra Part III .B, for a discussion of under-enforcement; See infra Part IV.A, for a discussion of
the consequences in Syria, and infra Part IV.B, for a discussion of over-enforcement.
22. See infra Part II.
23. See infra Part II.
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to expand upon the prohibitions, as well as looking at the more notable breaches
th
24
of the agreements in the second half of the 20 century. Part IV will look at the
application of chemical weapons treaties in the contemporary setting, and will
investigate what binds nations to these agreements by looking at the attacks in
Syria and the Bond case to determine what enforcement mechanisms are in place
25
and how adequate these mechanisms are in the modern world. The history of
chemical weapons treaties—and how they were understood by the societies that
adopted them—informs the context of treaty provisions issues the Bond case and
Syria both raise. Part V will suggest a means of strengthening chemical weapons
treaties by creating better enforcement mechanisms and more specific definitions
26
of what constitutes a chemical weapon.
II. THE FIRST WORLD WAR & THE GENEVA PROTOCOL
A. The Origins of Chemical Warfare in the Modern Era: The Push for
Development and the Call for Restrictions
27

On April 22, 1915, German troops at the Ypres salient launched what was
to that date the largest use of chemical gas against enemy combatants in warfare,
releasing chlorine gas against French and British troops and provoking moral
28
outrage and indignation from Allied leaders. While Ypres is the best-known use
of asphyxiating gas, and the one that drew the most attention, the French had
been using milder chemical gas irritants against German troops as early as 1914
29
in efforts to break through the enemy line. These early attempts were largely
unsuccessful in doing more than temporarily impairing the soldiers caught in the
attacks, but the French use of gas may have encouraged German research into a
more effective chemical weapons program that led to the chlorine attack at
30
Ypres.
While popular belief fixes the beginnings of chemical warfare at Ypres, in
fact it has a much longer history in modern times, reaching all the way back to

24. See infra Part III.
25. See infra Part IV.
26. See infra Part V.
27. A salient is a bulge in the line surrounded by the enemy on three sides. The Ypres salient was one of
the best-known of the war. The Great War 1914-1918, The Ypres Salient Battlefields, Belgium, http://www.
greatwar.co.uk/ypres-salient/ (last visited Sep. 20, 2014).
28. Ulrich Trumpener, The Road to Ypres: The Beginnings of Gas Warfare in World War I, 47 J. MOD.
HIST. 460, 460–61 (1975). An estimated 150 tons of compressed chlorine was released into the wind, spreading
to cover a 4 mile wide area. Despite the scale of the attack, German troops did not actually achieve any decisive
strategic victory, and the Ypres salient remained. Id.
29. Id. at 461–63.
30. Id. at 463.
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31

theoretical discussions of its use during the Napoleonic Wars. The discussion
arose again in 1846, where a government committee in Britain voted against the
32
use of sulfur dioxide launched from ships. In addition to being concerned about
breaching the rules of “civilized” warfare, the committee was concerned with
other nations learning the secret of the new weapon once the British deployed it
33
in war. Given that proliferation is one of the biggest concerns about the use of
chemical weapons today, this rationale for discouraging their use suggests a
34
parallel with modern times and indicates that the “othering” of chemical
35
weapons extends much further into the past than the First World War.
Despite the urgings of two separate advocates for their use, the British again
36
declined to deploy poison gases against the Russians during the Crimean War.
Across the Atlantic, at least two Northerners wrote letters to military authorities
suggesting possible designs for chemical weapons shells to use the American
Civil War, and there is anecdotal evidence that, late in the war, glass grenades
filled with gas-producing chemicals may have been developed, though whether
37
or not they existed or were merely conceptualized is unclear.
Although there is no evidence of chemical weapons use in any major
th
Western conflict by the close of the 19 century, there was enough concern about
the possibility of their use that delegates to the first Hague Conference in 1899
felt the need to include a provision in the Hague Peace Conference known as
Hague Declaration IV, banning the use of “projectiles the sole object of which is

31. Wyndham D. Miles, The Idea of Chemical Warfare in Modern Times, 31 J. HIST. OF IDEAS 297, 297
(1970). Miles claims that as early as 1811, British Naval Officer Thomas Cochrane began working on a plan to
use gas from burning sulfur to attack French fortifications. Id.
32. Id. at 298.
33. Id.
34. The term “othering” is used in anthropology to describe the process by which one group points out the
perceived weaknesses of one group in order to make one’s own group seem more powerful in comparison. Sara
Rismyhr Engelund, Introductory Essay: “The Other” and “Othering,” NEW NARRATIVES, http://newnarratives.
wordpress.com/issue-2-the-other/other-and-othering-2/ (last visited May 26, 2014). Here, I use the term to describe
the way in which society has come to view chemical weapons as fundamentally different from other means of
killing and the creation of the idea that chemical weapons are inherently cruel, while other means of causing death
are seen as less so.
35. See, e.g., J. P. Perry Robinson, Disarmament and Other Options for Western Policy-Making on
Chemical Warfare, 63 INT’L AFFAIRS 65 (1986). (discussing chemical weapons in the context of Cold War
deterrence and concerns that Soviet chemical weapons advancements may outstrip American programs.)
36. Miles, supra note 31, at 298-99. Thomas Cochrane again pushed for the use of sulfur against Russian
forces at Sevastopol, while Lyon Playfair advocated the use of brittle metal shells filled with acodyls cyanide
against Russian ships. Both ideas were rejected by the War Department. Once again, proponents sought to
combine naval engagements and chemical gas. This historic connection to naval warfare may suggest why the
first agreement about chemical weapons following World War I was the Washington Treaty relating to the Use
of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare; Treaty relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in
Warfare, Washington, Feb. 6, 1922, 25 L.N.T.S. 202 (hereinafter “Washington Naval Treaty”).
37. Miles, supra note 31, at 300–03. Miles cites a number of letters and articles written during the Civil
War that reference chemical weapons in detail, but they contain mostly theoretical discussions, and he is unable
to present any direct evidence that any of these weapons actually went into production or were ever tested. Id.
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38

the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases.” The wording of this
Declaration, while seemingly straight-forward, suggests some leeway regarding
the types of weapons it covers, which is also characteristic of later, post-war
39
agreements. The Declaration bans projectiles, but says nothing about other
40
methods of delivery. As the attack at Ypres consisted of cylinders of
compressed chlorine gas released into the wind by nozzles, this was technically
not a violation of the specific language of the Declaration, though it clearly went
41
against the Declaration’s intent. Germany, France, and Britain were all
signatories of Hague Declaration IV and, by the end of the war, all had deployed
42
chemical weapons against enemy troops.
Indeed, it seems that German High Command, in planning how to deploy
chemical weapons, did carefully consider the wording of the Hague Peace
43
Conference as a whole, along with the specifics of Hague Declaration IV.
Despite the Conference banning poisoned weapons, German officials determined
that, since “asphyxiating gases” were covered under an agreement separate from
the agreement on poisoned weapons, they did not fall under the stricter ban of the
44
latter. Additionally, later gas shells carried an explosive payload along with a
45
chemical agent, creating an explosion on impact and disbursing gas. The
purpose of the explosive seems to have been to prevent the shells from violating
46
Hague Declaration IV and its “sole object” clause. Since the shells now created
explosive blasts along with releasing chlorine or mustard gases into the air, they
47
were not weapons whose “sole object” was delivery of poison gas. That these
uses were not technical violations, despite clearly being uses of gas weapons,
suggests a conundrum later treaties would struggle to solve: how can a treaty be
specific enough to clearly state what it intends to ban, yet broad enough to cover
48
weapons not yet developed or even conceived?

38. Hague Declaration IV—Concerning the Prohibition of the Use of Projectiles Diffusing Asphyxiating
Gases, July 29, 1899, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 998, 187 Consol. T.S. 453 (hereinafter “Hague IV”).
39. See Washington Naval Treaty, supra note 36. See also Geneva Protocol, supra note 7.
40. Hague IV, supra note 38.
41. Ellwood B. Spear, Some Problems of Gas Warfare, 8 SCI. MONTHLY 275, 275 (1919).
42. Hague IV, supra note 38. Britain became a signatory in 1907, seven years before the start of the war.
Treaties and States Parties to Such Treaties, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (Sep. 20, 2014),
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelect
ed=165
43. Trumpener, supra note 28, at 468.
44. Id.
45. Spear, supra note 41, at 277.
46. Trumpener, supra note 28, at 468.
47. Id.
48. Along with its lack of clarity about exactly what types of weapons it bans, Hague Declaration IV
contains another important provision that reappears in the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty and the 1925 Geneva
Protocol, the clause that it only prohibits the use of chemical weapons by one signatory against another
signatory. Hague IV, supra note 38. Washington Naval Treaty, supra note 36 art. 5; Geneva Protocol, supra
note 7. Unlike subsequent, post-war treaties, Hague Declaration IV makes it clear that it is not banning the use
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In the decades between the drafting of Hague Declaration IV and the Geneva
Protocol, chemical weapons transitioned from a theoretical possibility and
49
experimental curiosity to a gruesome reality of trench warfare. This reality
seeped from the battlefield back to the home front, where poets like Wilfred
Owen described the horror of a gas attack in lurid detail, capturing the image of a
50
soldier “[a]s under a green sea, . . . guttering, choking, drowning.” Men who
survived gas attacks brought that experience with them when they considered
how best to face this new world where chemical gas was now a very real wartime
51
threat. With these new perspectives on the dangers chemical weapons posed, the
international community put forth a new agreement with stronger language that
reflected the moral disapproval of World War I’s violations of Hague Declaration
52
IV.
B. Washington and Geneva: Creating the New Norm
By the end of World War I, it was clear that the Hague Conference was
completely ineffective in preventing the use of chemical weapons, possibly
53
because it was unclear what would happen if the ban was violated. Hague
Declaration IV required only that the Contracting Powers “abstain” from using
asphyxiating gases, a mild word that did little to prevent the proliferation of
54
chemical gases on both sides. While the blanket ban on the use of particular
types of gas shells was unique within the Conference, which mostly banned
particular uses of technology—regarding the weapons themselves as neutral, the
of chemical weapons in all circumstances, only in specific situations against signatories. Hague IV, supra note
38. The Declaration states:
“The present Declaration is only binding on the Contracting Powers in the case of a war between two or more of
them. It shall cease to be binding from the time when, in a war between the Contracting Powers, one of the
belligerents shall be joined by a non-Contracting Power.” Id.. Compare this to the language of the Geneva
Protocol, where the High Contracting Parties “agree to be bound as between themselves according to the terms
of this declaration,” and pledge to “exert every effort to induce other States to accede to the present Protocol.”
Geneva Protocol, supra note 7. The Washington Naval Treaty contains similar language. See Washington Naval
Treaty, supra note 36. Hague Declaration IV makes it very clear that the Declaration no longer applies
whenever a non-Contracting Power joins a war between two or more Contracting Powers, suggesting the
prohibition is more of a matter of contract law than an international declaration of disapproval. Hague IV, supra
note 38.
49. See Trumpener, supra note 28, at 460.
50. Owen, supra note 1.
51. See Victor Lefebure, Chemical Warfare: The Possibility of its Control, 7 TRANSACTIONS OF THE
GROTIUS SOC’Y 153, 153–54 (1921).
52. Richard Price, A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo, 49 INT’L ORG. 73, 92 (1995). There has
been some argument that one of the reasons for the military’s willingness to ban chemical weapons is their lack
of effectiveness. While there is some merit to this argument, it is also clear that, in the general consciousness, at
least, chemical weapons represent a morally reprehensible method of warfare, and it is this general
consciousness that developed following World War I, and which continues to influence how chemical weapons
are perceived. For more of a discussion on the various arguments about effectiveness, see id. at 82–84.
53. Id.
54. Hague IV, supra note 38.
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Declaration left a great deal unstated, allowing for an interpretation that followed
55
the letter of the law, even while it violated the spirit.
By declaring chemical gas illegal in wartime, even against soldiers, what
Hague Declaration IV did was set the stage for public outcry when it was
56
violated (or appeared to be violated, according to popular opinion.) The
Declaration created a new norm for the conduct of “civilized warfare,” and the
fact that it was powerless to stop the debacle that unfolded during the First World
War paradoxically strengthened that norm, reaffirming international disapproval
57
and solidifying the idea that chemical gas needed to be banned from war.
This new norm appears first in the language of the 1922 Washington Naval
Treaty, which proclaims that:
The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all
analogous liquids, materials or devices, having been justly condemned
by the general opinion of the civilized world and a prohibition of such
use having been declared in treaties to which a majority of the civilized
Powers are parties.
The Signatory Powers, to the end that this prohibition shall be universally
accepted as a part of international law binding alike the conscience and practice
of nations, declare their assent to such prohibition, agree to be bound thereby as
58
between themselves and invite all other civilized nations to adhere thereto.
Within the space of two sentences, the Treaty uses the word “civilized” three
59
times. Additionally, in place of Hague Declaration IV’s “inspired by the
sentiments which found expression in the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 29
November (11 December) 1868,” rationale for its ban, the Washington Naval
Treaty makes clear that chemical gases have been “justly condemned by the
60
general opinion of the civilized world,” a much stronger statement of purpose.
The Washington Naval Treaty never came into effect, but the language
prohibiting chemical weapons had a direct impact on the Geneva Protocol of
61
1925. The Geneva Protocol contains a nearly-identical statement that, “Whereas
the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous
liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion
of the civilized world,” the High Contracting Powers agree not to use chemical
55. Price, supra note 52, at 90.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 92.
58. Washington Naval Treaty, supra note 36, at art. 5 (emphasis added).
59. Id.
60. Hague IV, supra note 38; Washington Naval Treaty, supra note 36.
61. Price, supra note 52, at 90. Interestingly, it was France, not the United States, that prevented the treaty
from taking force. The Senate quickly ratified the Washington Naval Treaty, but France objected to provisions
regarding submarines, so the treaty never took effect. Daniel P. Jones, American Chemists and the Geneva
Protocol, 71 ISIS 426, 428–29 (1980).
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62

weapons against each other. Despite only mentioning “civilized” once, the
Geneva Protocol makes clear the international stance against chemical warfare
63
and the conviction of the High Contracting Parties to uphold this ideal.
Beyond moral disapproval, however, the Geneva Protocol is vague on what,
64
specifically, parties may not do under its terms. The Protocol declares the
prohibition on chemical weapons as “universally accepted as a part of
International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations,” yet
talks about “induc[ing] other States to accede to the . . . Protocol,” suggesting
that the universality of the Protocol even at the time was not completely
65
assured. The phrase “exert every effort to induce other States to accede” may
suggest—but does not explicitly state—that the Protocol gives the High
Contracting Powers the ability to use military force to ensure compliance as an
66
enforcement mechanism. However, it seems that the chief motivating factor in
favor of compliance was—and continues to be—fear of what might happen if
67
chemical warfare is able to develop unchecked. That is to say, the threat of
intervention by other nations is less of a deterrent than the perceived horrors of
68
unchecked chemical warfare, particularly against one’s own nation.
As early as 1921, fears of what the next war would look like drove concerns
that, without a means of control, chemical weapons would dominate any future
69
conflicts. The perceived military effectiveness of chemical weapons, combined
with opponents pushing for a strong ban cultivated the impression that gas and
other chemical weapons played a much larger role in modern warfare than reality
70
supported.
Victor Lefebure, writing in 1921, declared chemical weapons a “far too
potent, decisive, flexible, secret, and generally dangerous [thing] to be left
71
unharnessed in a world which pretends to disarm.” His main concern was that
anything but strict, complete compliance with chemical disarmament would lead
to the few hold-out powers gaining too much control over warfare and
72
threatening peace. This concern over national defense, coupled with American
th
exceptionalism and isolationist tendencies in the first half of the 20 century,
drove the American Chemical Warfare Service branch of the United States Army

62. Geneva Protocol, supra note 7.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Price, supra note 52, at 93.
68. Id.
69. Lefebure, supra note 51, at 156.
70. Price, supra note 52, at 93. See also Lefebure, supra note 51, at 155–58. (discussing the perceived
relative effectiveness of chemical weapons as cheaper, deadlier alternatives to conventional weaponry).
71. Lefebure, supra note 51, at 157.
72. See generally id.
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73

to successfully lobby to prevent American ratification of the Geneva Protocol. It
was not until late 1969 that President Richard Nixon finally announced he would
seek the advice and consent of the Senate to ratify the Geneva Protocol, fortyfour years after it was first drafted, and well after it had generally come to be
74
accepted as customary international law.
The American pro-chemical weapons arguments parallel the concerns
75
Lefebure puts forth, but come to the opposite conclusion. Rather than believing
that the horrors of gas warfare made complete disarmament a likelihood, a
number of Americans championed the cause of chemical warfare as the more
humane way of the future and saw agreement to the Geneva Protocol as
76
hamstringing America’s position in future wars. Most of those proponents of
chemical weapons were chemists and members of such organizations as the
77
Chemical Foundation. Because of groups like the Chemical Foundation,
78
America did not ratify the Geneva Protocol until the Nixon Administration.

73. Jones, supra note 61, at 420.
74. Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 7, at 853.
75. See J. M. Scammell, Chemical Warfare in the Future, 216 N. Am. Rev. 476, 479–80 (1922).
76. Id. at 80.). Scammell cites some dubious statistics in his article to support this position and focuses his
argument that gas is generally non-lethal and more humane than conventional weapons around the number of
gas-related casualties and deaths in the American Army during the War. See id. at 480. There are a few issues
with these statistics that would suggest unreliability. To begin with, Scammell discounts the possibility that gas
causes tuberculosis (or at least increases a survivor’s susceptibility to the disease) and claims that it does not
mutilate or disfigure, which is contrary to many accounts of survivors of gas attacks who lived with diminished
lung capacity from scarring, not to mention psychological damage. Id. at 480; See E. Jones, B. Everitt, S.
Ironside, I. Palmer and S. Wessely, Psychological Effects of Chemical Weapons: A Follow-up Study of First
World War Veterans, 38 PSYCHOLOGICAL MEDICINE 1419, 1419–26 (2008) (discussing the various symptoms
reported by survivors of gas attacks and attempting to determine which were psychological). This suggests that
his figure for deaths from gas attacks is limited only to battlefield casualties and thus is a low estimate of the
actual deaths caused by poison gas. On top of that, by focusing only on American casualties, Scammell looks at
only the period of time America was involved in the war, from April of 1917 to November 11, 1918. American
Entry into World War I, 1917, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (May 26, 2014),
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/wwi. Since, realistically, the bulk of the American Army did not
arrive in Europe until early 1918, his numbers at most look at around a fourth of the entire war, from only one
side. See id. Along the same lines, the Americans arrived at the end of the war, after both sides had developed
more effective defenses against chemical weapons, so one would expect American casualties to be much lower.
See generally Spear, supra note 41 (explaining the evolution of gas disbursal methods and gas masks during the
war).
77. Jones, supra note 61, at 426.
78. Id. at 427. While the pressure these groups exerted so successfully may indicate a belief in the utility
and importance of chemical weapons for America’s future, the actual public sentiment is more difficult to
extrapolate from America’s apparent support of chemical warfare, since the outpouring of pro-chemical
weapons polemics from American chemists were as likely to be responses to vilification of their profession by
the American public as genuine expressions of deeply-held beliefs. See id. This concern over the perception of
chemistry as aiding chemical weapons lingers within chemists’ societies today, but rather than producing
opposition to restrictions, these concerns promote the gap between legitimate and illegitimate uses of chemicals,
increasing the vilification of chemical weapons by juxtaposing it against chemists aiming to improve society.
See Brief for the American Chemistry Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 16, Bond v.
United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011) (No. 12-158). See infra III.B for more discussion of the ratification
process.
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A better indicator of where Americans stood on the issue of chemical
weapons was not whether the Geneva Protocol was ratified, but whether it was
followed in the next war, despite the lack of any binding international legal
79
restraints on American decision-making.
III. THE SECOND WORLD WAR & THE COLD WAR: CONSOLIDATION OF NORMS
A. The Second World War: The Establishment of an International Taboo and
80
the First Test of Geneva
Despite the apparent victory of the chemical weapons lobby in the interwar
years, every American president during those years, beginning with Warren G.
81
Harding, supported abolishing chemical weapons use. However, when war
broke out in Europe in 1939, anticipating the potential advent of a new round of a
chemical warfare Armageddon, the American Chemical Warfare Service began
82
to re-arm in preparation for attacks. Given the flagrant breaches of Hague
83
Declaration IV in the last world war and the relative lack of specific legal
84
restraints contained within the Geneva Protocol itself, it should be rather
surprising then that the major powers in the European theater refrained from
85
unleashing chemical weapons against each other.
This is not to say that chemical weapons never made an appearance after
86
World War I. There have been a number of infractions following the signing of
the Geneva Protocol, including Spain’s use of its remaining World War I arsenal
87
against Moroccan rebels shortly after the Protocol was concluded. Italy also
unleashed chemical weapons against the Ethiopians in its conquest of that region
88
during World War II. Both of these instances involve a European nation using
chemical gas against a non-European population, revealing a remnant of the
attitudes contained in the old Hague Declaration IV in that there seems to have
79. John Ellis van Courtland Moon, Chemical Weapons and Deterrence: The World War II Experience, 8
Int’l. Security 3, 7 (1984).
80. While perhaps the best-known use of chemical weapons during World War II is Zyklon-B, used for
mass killings in concentration camps during the Holocaust, I have chosen not to include that example in my
analysis because the Holocaust and all its horrors is so beyond the scale of anything contemplated by the
drafters of the Geneva Protocol, it would require a separate article to do justice to all the unique issues it raises.
See generally At the Killing Centers, THE UNITED STATES HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM (May 26, 2014),
http://www.ushmm.org/outreach/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007714.
81. Van Courtland Moon, supra note 79, at 7.
82. Id., at 9–10.
83. Price, supra note 52, at 92.
84. See Geneva Protocol, supra note 7; see also Price, supra note 52, at 75.
85. Moon, supra note 79, at 9.
86. W. Michael Reisman, Chemical Weapons: Designing Operable Systems for Enforcing Restraint, 83
PROC. ANN. MEETING, AM. SOC’Y. INT’L. L. 468, 469 (1989).
87. Id.
88. Id.
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89

been little international concern about this type of use. However, it is significant
that neither of these nations tried to expand their targets to European countries at
90
the time. Given that much of the debate over chemical weapons proliferation in
Europe during the years between the First and Second World War centered
around apocalyptic imaginings of the destruction of civilization through chemical
weapons, it is perhaps not surprising than none of the major European powers
chose to turn their chemical stash against another power they considered able to
91
retaliate in kind.
In fact, in many ways it appears that concerns about retaliation drove at least
92
Allied decision makers more than concern for international law. While
President Roosevelt began his 1943 speech enunciating the American stance on
the use of chemical weapons by noting that their use “has been outlawed by the
93
general opinion of civilized mankind,” the remainder of the speech made it clear
that the United States intended to retaliate if Axis powers attacked with chemical
weapons, and discussions among high-level military officials indicate that
chemical weapons were ruled out by the Allies as a viable tactical option not
because they were illegal, but because they could lead to gas warfare in theaters
94
of war less prepared for a chemical attack. That Geneva’s ban on chemical
weapons had stood throughout the war served to strengthen the general
perception that chemical weapons were of a unique and dangerous character and
95
reinforced the notion that chemical weapons had no place in “civilized” warfare.
Interestingly, the Allies seemed more willing to consider the use of gas in
World War II than the Nazis, due to Hitler’s experience with gas in the trenches
of World War I, again suggesting that, at least at this point, international law was
much less of a consideration than retaliation in determining chemical weapons
96
policy. Regardless of the reasons, however, the Second World War established
that it was possible to conduct a war in the modern era without the use of

89. See id.
90. See id. at 469. As Hague Declaration IV was concerned mainly with preventing the use of chemical
weapons between signatories, some element of that mentality may have carried over into the mindset of European
nations interpreting the Geneva Protocol in that Morocco did not ratify the Geneva Protocol until 1970 and Ethiopia
had just ratified the Protocol in 1935, the same year Italy invaded. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. Geneva, 17 June 1925,
ICRC: TREATIES AND STATES PARTIES TO SUCH TREATIES (May 14, 2012), http://www.icrc.org/applic/
ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=280; See Lina Grip and
John Hart, The Use of Chemical Weapons in the 1935–36 Italo-Ethiopian War, SIPRI Arms Control and Nonproliferation Programme, 1, 1 (2009), available at http://www.sipri.org/research/disarmament/chemical/
publications/.
91. Moon, supra note 79, at 5; see also Reisman, supra note 86. at 469.
92. Moon, supra note 79, at 14–19.
93. Id. at 14.
94. Id. at 14–19.
95. Price, supra note 52, at 96.
96. Moon, supra note 79, at 25–26.
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chemical weapons, and that precedent would foster the growing image of
97
chemical weapons as “inhumane” in the decades that followed.
th

B. The Second Half of the 20 Century: Rogue States and the “Poor Man’s
98
Bomb”
Forty-four years after the Geneva Protocol was originally drafted, Richard
Nixon brought the treaty before the Senate to ask advice and consent on ratifying
an agreement that, even at the time, was considered to be customary international
99
law. Part of American reluctance to sign on to Geneva centered around debates
about whether chemicals like tear gas or anti-plant agents fall under the broad
umbrella of the Protocol’s prohibition of “asphyxiating, poisonous or other
100
gases.” The United States used various herbicides, the most famous of which
was Agent Orange, to destroy forests providing cover for the Viet-Cong in
101
Vietnam, and to destroy crops providing food to the enemy. Concerns over the
applicability of the Geneva Protocol to chemicals like Agent Orange prompted
the U.S. to vote against a 1969 Resolution specifying that Geneva applied to
“[a]ny chemical agents of warfare-chemical substances, whether gaseous, liquid
or solid-which might be employed because of their direct toxic effects on man,
102
animals or plants.”
Despite these concerns, the United States ratified the Geneva Protocol on
103
January 22, 1975. Given U.S. reticence to sign on to the Protocol, it should be
unsurprising that the American response to the first use of chemical weapons in
warfare since the U.S. ratified the treaty was tempered more by concern about
104
political relations than about compliance with the spirit of the Protocol.

97. Price, supra note 52, at 73.
98. Id.
99. Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 7, at 853.
100. Id. at 855.
101. Agent Orange, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/8993/
Agent-Orange (last visited Feb. 11, 2014). Agent Orange, while the most famous, was not the only herbicide the
US used in Vietnam. In fact, a variety of others were used, but gained less notoriety. The chemicals were given
color names based on the color-coded bands on their storage drums. Id.
th
102. Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 7, at 865; G.A. Res. 2603 (XXIV), U.N. GAOR, 24 Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/RES/2603 (Dec. 16, 1969).
103. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (Geneva Protocol), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/
t/isn/4784.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2013). Gerald Ford was the president who actually ratified the Protocol,
after the Senate unanimously voted for its approval. This was almost exactly fifty years from when the treaty
was first signed, and forty-seven years after it came into effect. Id.
104. Glen Kessler, History Lesson: When the United States Looked the Other Way on Chemical Weapons,
THE WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 4, 2013) available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/wp/
2013/09/04/history-lesson-when-the-united-states-looked-the-other-way-on-chemical-weapons/.
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During the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqis deployed chemical weapons against Iran,
105
manufactured from materials often supplied by American sources. By 1983,
State Department intelligence reports declared that Iraq was deploying chemical
weapons against Iran on an almost daily basis, yet Americans did not intervene in
106
any way. In fact, the United States was assisting the Iraqis with battlefield
107
intelligence.
Why such a lack of American outrage at the blatant use of chemical
weapons? One possibility is that American policymakers were more concerned
108
with the possible rise of Iran than the breach of the Geneva Protocol. The war
between Iran and Iraq began in 1980, the year after the Islamic Revolution in Iran
109
placed Ayatollah Khomeini in power , and American sentiment toward Iran was
110
fairly hostile.
This lack of response, or at least lack of affirmative response, illustrates one
of the largest flaws in the Geneva Protocol, namely that, without a specific
mechanism for enforcement, compliance hinges on its signatories’ willingness to
111
require other nations to uphold its prohibitions. In the case of the Iran-Iraq War,
the Protocol’s prohibitions simply were not strong enough to overcome American
political concerns and interests in Iraqi victory, allowing the American
government to simply ignore clear evidence of chemical weapons use by its
112
113
allies. The response of the U.N. was hardly more effective. After an extensive
investigation, the U.N. Security Council stated that they were “profoundly
concerned” about the findings that Iraq had used chemical weapons, and
114
“strongly condemned” continued use in violation of the Protocol. The Security
Council and the General Assembly both issued a number of similar statements,
declaring that they expected compliance with the Protocol and that they
condemned the actions of Iraq, but they took no substantive measures beyond
115
this.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Roger Hardy, The Iran-Iraq War: 25 Years on, BBC NEWS (Sept. 22, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/middle_east/4260420.stm.
110. Kessler, supra, note 104. America had long had a special relationship with the Shah, after a 1953
CIA-backed coup installed him in power. When the Shah came to America for cancer treatment in 1979, a mob
of Iranian students overran the American Embassy in Tehran. Fifty-two American embassy workers remained
hostages in Iran until the end of President Carter’s term in office, despite attempts to free them. The Iranian
Hostage Crisis, THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE , http://www.pbs.org/ wgbh/americanexperience/features/generalarticle/carter-hostage-crisis/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
111. See Geneva Protocol, supra note 7.
112. Kessler supra, note 104.; Geneva Protocol, supra note 7.
113. Timothy L. H. McCormack, International Law and the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Gulf War,
21 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 1, 21, 21 (1991).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 21 –28.
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C. Remodeling the Taboo: The Chemical Weapons Convention
In an effort to strengthen the prohibitions on chemical weapons, and to
clarify what could and could not be traded, the nations of the world came
116
together in 1993 to create a new, more extensive treaty on chemical weapons.
One of the most important additions the new Chemical Weapons Convention
introduced was a verification process, instituting a means for the international
community to inspect for compliance with the treaty, and setting up a process for
117
destruction of prohibited chemicals. A considerably more extensive document
than the Geneva Protocol, the CWC sought to define “chemical weapons” as
more than just the “asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous
118
liquids, materials or devices,” the CWC lays out the following definition of
chemical weapons:
(a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for
purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and
quantities are consistent with such purposes;
(b) Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other
harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in
subparagraph (a), which would be released as a result of the employment
of such munitions and devices;
(c) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection
with the employment of munitions and devices specified in subparagraph
119
(b).
While this is a much longer definition, it still suffers from the same broad
language that characterizes the Geneva Protocol, particularly in the range of
substances that can be classified as a “toxic chemical,” which the CWC defines
as “Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause
120
death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals.” In
fact, while the CWC does include an Annex, with certain specific chemicals
listed, not only is this list non-exhaustive, but the guidelines for determining
whether a new chemical falls under the Schedule of chemicals can be read nearly

116. CWC, supra note 17, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 (1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45, preamble.
117. See David A. Koplow, Long Arms and Chemical Arms: Extraterritoriality and the Draft Chemical
Weapons Convention, 15 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 25 (1990).
118. Geneva Protocol, supra note 7.
119. CWC, supra note 17, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 (1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45, art. II.
120. Id. For more explanation of how broad this definition is in practice, see the discussion of the Bond
case, infra Part IV.B.
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as broadly and mostly relate to the Verification Annex and reporting
121
requirements.
The CWC sets out a detailed plan for the systematic destruction of chemical
weapons by the signatories and creates a new body, the Organization for the
122
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (“the Organization”), to oversee compliance.
However, it is unclear what specific measures will follow a violation, as the
remedy for cases of “particular gravity” is for the members of the Convention to
123
refer the matter to the U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council.
Additionally, the powers of the Organization are restricted to enforcing
124
compliance among member States.
IV. A NATION IN REVOLT & A JEALOUS RIVAL: CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
WITH CHEMICAL WEAPONS
A. The Syrian Problem: Enforcing the Ban against a Nation in Revolt
In the early morning hours of August 21, 2013, Syrian government forces
launched a series of missiles, loaded with sarin gas, at about half a dozen
125
neighborhoods controlled by rebel forces. The warheads, Soviet-era M-14
surface-to-surface rockets, were able to carry between 11 and 16 gallons of
126
chemical agent apiece, with several missiles found at each attack site. Sarin is a
nerve agent, an airborne poison gas that is odorless, colorless, and tasteless,
127
making it difficult to detect. It attacks the nervous system and can cause death
128
within minutes , while those who survive exposure experience a range of

121. Id. at Annex on Chemical Weapons. The Guidelines do insert language that can be read as
narrowing, describing, for example, Schedule 1 chemicals as those that have “little to no use for purposes not
prohibited under this convention.” Id. at Annex for Chemicals, (A)(1)(c). The problem with this limitation,
though, is that it may be both overbroad and under-inclusive, depending on what situation may arise. While a
vast improvement over the Geneva Protocol, the detailed classification standards of the CWC are still less than
adequate to prevent the use of chemical weapons by a determined nation.
122. Id. at art. IV, art. VIII.
123. Id. at art. XII. The CWC also suggests that, for cases where a party has been requested to take action
and has failed to do so, the Conference can suspend that party’s rights and privileges under the CWC until it is
in compliance. For more serious matters, the Conference “may recommend collective measures to States Parties
in conformity with international law.” CWC, supra note 17, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 (1993), 1974 U.N.T.S.
45, art. XII.
124. Id. at art. VIII.
125. Joby Warrick, More Than 1,400 Killed in Syrian Chemical Weapons Attack, U.S. Says, THE
WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 30 2013) http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nearly-1500killed-in-syrian-chemical-weapons-attack-us-says/2013/08/30/b2864662-1196-11e3-85b6d27422650fd5_story.html.
126. Syria Chemical Attack: What We Know, BBC NEWS (Sept. 24, 2013, 5:46 AM), http://www.bbc.co.
uk/news/world-middle-east-23927399.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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symptoms, “including shortness of breath, disorientation, eye irritation, blurred
129
vision, nausea, vomiting and general weakness.”
The American response was considerably more disapproving than the
response to the Iran-Iraq War use of chemical weapons, but remained cautious
130
while the details of the attack were still under investigation. As early as June of
2013, the U.S. had raised concerns that Syria was using chemical weapons
against rebel forces, and while talk of aid and the possibility of establishing a NoFly Zone came from the White House, ultimately the international community
131
took a different step to prevent Syria’s continued use of chemical agents.
132
When the attacks took place, Syria was not a signatory to the CWC.
However, as international pressure mounted, Syria’s Assad regime, already
133
bound by the Geneva Protocol, agreed to become a party to the CWC. The
CWC’s Organization set forth an accelerated plan for the destruction of Syria’s
134
weapons and the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution on September 27,
135
2013 to further implement this program. The U.S., Russia, and NATO then
began working out the details of the long process of destroying Syria’s extensive
136
chemical weapons cache.
How voluntary Syria’s agreement to sign the CWC raises issues about the
enforceability of a ban on chemical weapons where even the treaty with the most
teeth is limited by its applicability to only signatories, one of the concerns raised
by the post-World War I scholars regarding any type of meaningful prohibition
137
of chemical weapons. With help from Russia, Syria acceded to international
pressure fairly easily, but that in itself raises the question of what would happen
138
with a more defiant regime, or a less united international front.
129. Id.
130. In the intervening years between Reagan’s response to the Iran-Iraq War and Obama’s steps in
dealing with Syria, the United States had gone to war in Iraq during George W. Bush’s administration over
claims that Saddam was stockpiling “Weapons of Mass Destruction,” including chemical weapons, in
contravention of the CWC. These claims turned out to be false and the resultant war between the U.S. and Iraq
drew criticism, possibly contributing to Obama’s caution. See Warrick, supra note 125.
131. Karen DeYoung & Anne Gearan, U.S., Citing Use of Chemical Weapons by Syria, to Provide Direct
Military Support to Rebels, THE WASHINGTON POST (Jun. 13, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/us-concludes-syrian-forces-used-chemical-weapons/2013/06/13/59b03c66-d46d-11e2a73e-826d299ff459_story.html; Syria’s Chemical Weapons Stockpile, BBC NEWS (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22307705.
132. See Freedman, supra note 5.
133. Id.
134. OPCW Director-General Welcomes Agreement on Syrian Chemical Weapons, ORGANIZATION FOR
THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS (Sept. 14, 2013), http://www.opcw.org/news/article/opcw-directorgeneral-welcomes-agreement-on-syrian-chemical-weapons/.
135. S.C. Res. 2118, U.N. Doc, S/RES/2118 (Sept. 27, 2013).
136. Gabriela Baczynska & Adrian Croft, Exclusive: Russia, NATO Plan Joint Operation on Syria’s
Chemical Weapons, REUTERS (Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/14/us-syria-crisis-russianato-idUSBREA1D0Y120140214.
137. See Freedman, supra note 5.
138. Id.
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The issue is compounded by the fact that, despite a number of breaches of the
Geneva Protocol, there is no real historical blueprint for an acceptable
international community’s response in Syria, since the general response
139
throughout history has been fairly weak at best. Even using the response to the
last confirmed use of chemical weapons in warfare by Iraq provides little
guidance, as the U.S. did nothing, and the U.N. did little more than pass
resolutions expressing disapproval; neither of these responses is likely to bring
140
about an end to the use of chemical weapons by a determined regime.
Given America’s pattern of lukewarm enthusiasm for controls on chemical
weapons, it is somewhat difficult to exert influence by claiming the moral high
141
ground in this matter, another factor to consider regarding enforcement.
Additionally, this moral authority, the U.S. Government claims, is at stake in a
case raising the issue of whether a statute enacting the CWC can be brought to
142
bear against an individual.
B. Bond v. United States: Chemical Weapons in Everyday Life?
The phrase “chemical weapons” evokes images of war-torn landscapes and
battered soldiers or civilians, struggling to breathe as they run from militarized
death. It does not generally call to mind a Pennsylvania woman sneaking around
the car and mailbox of a romantic rival and covering the other woman’s door
143
knobs and car handles with ill-concealed chemicals. Yet a grand jury in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania charged Carol Anne Bond with possessing and
using a chemical weapon under 18 U.S.C. section 229, the statute implementing
the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, for attempting to poison Myrlinda
144
Haynes with chemicals stolen from work and ordered on the internet.
Bond’s story seems more at home on a soap opera than at the center of a
debate over federalism and an international chemical weapons treaty. Haynes and
Bond had been friends, and when Haynes announced she was pregnant, Bond
145
was initially excited. Upon learning that the father of Haynes’s child was none
other than Bond’s own husband, however, Bond decided to exact revenge
146
through poison. Trained as a microbiologist and employed by the chemical
manufacturer Rohm and Haas, Bond stole toxic chemicals from work and
139. See supra Parts II , III, for a discussion of the international community’s responses after World War
I, World War II, and the Iran-Iraq War.
140. See Kessler, supra note 104; McCormack, supra note 113, at 21–28.
141. See supra Parts II & III, for a discussion of U.S. reluctance to agree to sign onto the Geneva
Protocol.
142. Richey, supra note 14
143. United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2009) rev’d and remanded, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 180
L. Ed. 2d 269 (U.S. 2011).
144. Id. at 131–32
145. Id. at 131.
146. Id.
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147

ordered others over the internet. She then spread these chemicals on Haynes’s
doorknob, car door handles, and mailbox numerous times over the course of
148
several months. While these chemicals are toxic and have the potential to cause
a great deal of harm, the worst injury Haynes sustained was a chemical burn to
her thumb on one occasion, mostly because Bond’s efforts at concealment were
149
inept enough that Haynes generally was able to avoid the chemicals.
When the local police suggested that the substance left around Haynes’s
house could be cocaine but did little else to help, Haynes contacted the United
States Postal Inspection Service, which set up surveillance cameras around
Haynes’s house and caught Bond stealing an envelope from Haynes’s mailbox
150
and placing chemicals inside the muffler of Haynes’s car. For these actions,
Bond faced two counts of possessing and using a chemical weapon under 18
151
U.S.C. section 229.
The federal statute that prosecutors charged Bond under makes it a criminal
offence for any person, other than those authorized by law, to knowingly
“develop, produce, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or indirectly, receive,
stockpile, retain, own, possess, or use, or threaten to use, any chemical
152
weapon.” A chemical weapon as defined by the statute constitutes any “toxic
chemical and its precursors, except where intended for a purpose not prohibited
under this chapter as long as the type and quantity is consistent with such a
153
purpose;” practically identical wording to the definition of chemical weapons
154
in the Chemical Weapons Convention. Both the statute and the convention
define “toxic chemical” as “any chemical which through its chemical action on
life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to
155
humans or animals.”
While the Bond case presents issues of federalism and the power of Congress
156
to enact legislation implementing treaties, it also illustrates the scope of
possible substances that could fall within the convention’s definition of “toxic
147. Id.
148. Id. at 132. The court states that there were at least 24 instances of Bond spreading chemicals around
Haynes’s house in these locations.
149. United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2009) rev’d and remanded, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 180
L. Ed. 2d 269 (U.S. 2011).
150. Id.
151. Id. Bond also faced two counts of mail theft, though these charges are not at issue.
152. 18 U.S.C.A. § 229(a)(1) (West 2013).
153. 18 U.S.C.A. § 229(f)(1)(A) (West 2013).
154. CWC, supra note 17, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 (1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45, art 2. Note that the only
change in wording is that “convention” becomes “chapter” in the American statute.
155. Id.
156. United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149, 151 (3d Cir. 2012) rev’d and remanded, 134 S. Ct.
2077(2014). In fact, the case was decided on Federalism grounds, with the majority declining to reach
interpreting the Chemical Weapons Convention, instead finding that Congressional intent in enacting the statute
could not have possibly meant to cover acts of attempted poisoning at the state level without a clear indication
otherwise. United States v. Bond, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (2014)
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chemical.” During oral arguments of the case before the Supreme Court on
November 5, 2013, Justice Alito noted that, under the strictest reading of the
terms of the statutory definition of “toxic chemical,” chocolate would be banned
because it is harmful to dogs and therefore meets a strictly literal interpretation of
158
the definition. The Court found that there was no indication that Congress
intended the statute to have such a broad interpretation, and decided that
“chemical weapon” should be interpreted closer to the popular idea of the term,
159
regardless of the literal text of the statute. While the idea that the purpose of
Congress, or the framers of the convention, was to ban chocolate is absurd, the
comment raises two very important concerns surrounding the enforcement of the
Chemical Weapons Convention: What actually constitutes a chemical weapon,
and just how common are they?
The answer to the first of these questions will suggest an answer to the
second, as it becomes easier to figure out how common chemical weapons are
once they are defined. Unfortunately, none of the chemical weapons treaties of
th
the 20 century offer any real guidance in determining what is not a chemical
160
weapon, only in suggesting things that could be. Therefore, in order to better
understand what a chemical weapon is, we need to look back at the evolution of
th
chemical weapons bans in the 20 century, where it becomes clear that the types
of chemicals the original signatories of the Geneva Protocol envisioned were
161
those used by nations against enemy combatants. Why, then, was this not
spelled out?
One reason for the ambiguous language could be to ensure that the Protocol
and its progeny would apply to broader international situations as they arose,
rather than requiring a new treaty every time one nation thought up a new
162
chemical weapon, or a different use for an old one. While maintaining a “know
157. See CWC, supra note 17, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 (1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45, art. 2. Indeed,
Justice Scalia, in his concurrence in the Bond case makes exactly this point, finding that the definition of
chemical weapon, as expressed in 18 U.S.C.A.§ 229, does in fact encompass Bond’s actions and would
therefore have decided the case on constitutionality grounds. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2094–95(Scalia, J.,
concurring).
158. Lyle Dennison, Argument Recap: A Tense Hour at the Court, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 5, 2013, 12:54
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/11/argument-recap-a-tense-hour-at-the-court/. Justice Alito was
describing the American statutory definition of “toxic chemical,” but as the wording of the American statute
and the definition in the convention are identical, his comments could be equally applied to either. Bond, 134 S.
Ct. at 2084; Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 229(f)(1)(A) (West 2013) with CWC, supra note 17, S. Treaty Doc. No.
103-21 (1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45 art. 2.
159. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2093.
160. See Geneva Protocol, supra note 7. See also G.A. Res. 2603 (XXIV), U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/RES/2603 (Dec. 16, 1969); CWC, supra note 17, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 (1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45,
art. 2.
161. See, e.g., Lefebure, supra note 51, at 153.
162. See generally Scammell, supra note 75. Scammell describes the evolution of chemical warfare over
the course of three years during World War I, suggesting the idea that rapid development of new technologies
would have been something his contemporaries were familiar with and may have considered in their drafting of
the Geneva Protocol.
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it when I see it” standard for chemical weapons might make sense in that
context, this standard makes it easy to dilute the power of labeling something a
“chemical weapon” in the international community by labeling a disparate array
of chemicals used as “weapons,” rather than confining the term to the more
164
traditional concept. When coupled with the lack of definite enforcement
165
The most powerful
mechanisms, the danger becomes more apparent.
enforcement mechanism for the Geneva Protocol and the CWC is the
166
international community’s fear of and moral outrage against chemical weapons.
By being able to classify routine poisonings as violations of the CWC, it removes
the power behind that outrage at such an unusual violation of the rules of
167
civilized warfare and reduces it to the commonplace.
V. DESIGNING A NEW APPROACH
A. Clarifying the Definition of Chemical Weapons
While the CWC expanded the definition of chemical weapons beyond the
“asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or
devices” of the Geneva Protocol, it did little to clear up what was—or more
168
precisely, what was not—covered by its definition. The drafters of the Geneva
Protocol were writing ten years after the first major use of chemical weapons in a
theater of war and with knowledge of the horrors these types of weapons can
169
cause. That knowledge is, thankfully, no longer common experience across the

163. In essence, this is the standard for defining a chemical weapon under 18 U.S.C.A. § 229 that the
Court adopts in Bond case, noting that taking the definition to reach as broadly as possible would produce
absurd results. See Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2090–92.
164. See Price, supra note 52, at 96 (1995). Price describes the usual course of moral outrage against a
particular weapon as such: “the historical record indicates that moral qualms about the use of novel technologies
of destruction issue most prominently (if not surprisingly) from those upon whom the weapons initially are
inflicted. Moral objections may continue once the monopoly is lost and the initial victim incorporates the new
weapon (as with the crossbow), but the overwhelming tendency is for such moral concerns to fall by the
wayside as the possibilities of technology are embraced by more than one party,” but points out that, at least so
far, gas shells have not followed this path. Id.
165. See supra Parts II.B, III.C, and IV.A, for a discussion of the lack of enforcement mechanisms in
place.
166. Compare Moon, supra note 79, at 14–19 (describing U.S. concerns about wartime retaliation) with
Kessler, supra note 104 (describing U.S. indifference during the Iran-Iraq War), suggesting that, between moral
outrage and fear of consequences, fear is a stronger motivation. See also Reisman, supra note 86, at 470.
167. One possible distinction regarding how chemical weapons use could be charged might be the
difference between use by a state or organized group as opposed to use by an individual. The CWC suggests
this could be a distinction, given the wording of Article I, but never explicitly states this. See CWC, supra note
17, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 (1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45 art. 1.
168. Compare Geneva Protocol, supra note 7 with CWC, supra note 17, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21
(1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45, art. II to see the way each document defines a chemical weapon.
169. Trumpener, supra note 28, at 460–61. See supra Part II.A, for a discussion about the experiences and
concerns of the post-World War I world.
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globe, but this raises the issue of whether a broad definitions of what constitutes
170
a chemical weapon serves to really protect against their use.
Because enforcement of the ban on chemical weapons is so dependent on
their perceived unique nature, defining what they are not is as important as
defining what they are, and will help facilitate enforcement by giving countries
notice about what is and is not acceptable use of substances that can have both
lethal and non-lethal uses, along with suggesting appropriate action for different
171
levels of violation. While the Bond case provides the most extreme case of
172
confusion over the magnitude of what the CWC covers, the Geneva Protocol’s
wording raises questions as to whether it covers only lethal or potentially lethal
173
agents, or whether compounds such as tear gas are also included in the ban.
An effective way of counteracting this confusion might be to modify the
schedule of chemicals and chemical weapons listed in the CWC Annex, which
currently is a non-exhaustive list with basic guidelines for including other
chemicals similar to those listed, such as how similar its chemical composition is
174
to a listed chemical. Beyond just classifying each known, agreed-upon
chemical weapon into levels, these categories could be modified to create two
additional sub-sets of classifications with corresponding consequences for use
175
under particular circumstances. Lethal chemicals, such as chlorine and mustard
gas, and nerve agents like sarin, used in particular ways, would occupy the first
level, as major offenses, and their use would bring about strong international
176
action. While not binding on those nations that do not agree to the
modification, such an amendment would memorialize the kind of reaction the
international community considers appropriate for a breach, requiring political
justification for more lenient measures.
A second level would encompass non-lethal chemical weapons, or chemicals
intended to be non-lethal, but which have deleterious effects, such as tear gas or

170. See supra Part III.A , B, for a discussion on incidents of chemical warfare since the adoption of the
Geneva Protocol.
171. See, e.g., Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 7, at 853–54; Reisman, supra note 86, at 470.
172. Dennison, supra note 158.
173. Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 7, at 853–54.
174. CWC, supra note 17, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 (1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45, Annex on Chemical
Weapons.
175. Such a scheme could be worked as a modification of the existing CWC, provided all the parties to
the CWC agreed to its amendment. The changes would not be binding on parties that choose not to agree, nor
would it bind third parties. United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, Austria, March 26-May
24, 1968, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Part IV, art. 39 et seq. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/11/Add.2
(May 23, 1969) (hereinafter “Vienna Convention”).
176. The CWC sets up the international legal framework for this to take place within Article XII, where
the Conference may recommend measures to ensure compliance in the event of a breach. In combination with
the recommendations in Part V(B), infra., this would provide a more specific set of guidelines than the CWC
currently has. See CWC, supra note 17, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 (1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45, art XII.
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herbicides used in warfare. This additional level of classification would allow
greater discretion for the international community to take into account specific
circumstances in responding, including the purpose of the chemical’s use, how
widespread the effects were, and whether other, viable, non-chemical options
178
were available to achieve this purpose. To protect the aim of inclusiveness
behind the broad definitions of chemical weapons in current treaties, this
schedule would not be considered exhaustive, and the Organization created by
the CWC would have the power to review new types of chemical weapons to
determine which level best describes their characteristics, but it would focus
179
more on the lethality of chemicals than the current Schedules. Significantly,
both schedules could explicitly set out circumstances and factors where use of
their particular chemicals would not be considered a violation of the CWC,
providing a compliment to the current list of factors meant to determine whether
180
something is a chemical weapon. The new classifications could work in tandem
with the current Schedules under the CWC, with the existing system suggesting
the severity of the violation and the new schedule providing guidance for
enforcement.
B. Agreeing on Enforcement Mechanisms
While the number of violations of the Geneva Protocol and its progeny has
been relatively low, the response to those violations has been less than
181
exemplary. The response to Syria’s latest use of sarin gas is, to date, the most
extensive proactive international action against a nation that has violated the
182
prohibitions on chemical weapons. Much of this has to do with the ambiguous

177. For a discussion on the debate over whether tear gas and Agent Orange qualify as asphyxiating
substances under the Geneva Protocol, see Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 7, at 856–57.
178. The standard of review I envision here is similar to that used by the U.S. Supreme Court in deciding
Dormant Commerce Clause issues. For an explanation of that standard, see Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340
U.S. 349, 354–56 (1951).
179. To prevent this provision from running afoul of the non-retroactivity clause of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, the wording of the schedule would need to include that the list was nonexclusive and that chemicals analogous to those listed would also be considered to violate the prohibition. If the
descriptions of what characteristics define each level are specific enough, this would serve to put nations on
notice. Vienna Convention, supra note 175, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/11/Add.2, Part III, sec. 2, art. 28 et seq.).
180. See CWC, supra note 17, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 (1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45, Annex on Chemical
Weapons. The concern about whether poisoning a goldfish to send a message to a governor, Godfather-style,
could be enough under the current wording to push the use of detergent into the category of terrorism and
assassination covered by the CWC could also be addressed by this classification, as detergent, generally
intended to be non-lethal, would fall under the second category, where the relatively minor impact of its use on
a single goldfish would point to it being classified as not a chemical weapon; See Bond v. United States, 134 S.
Ct. 2077, 2097 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurrence).
181. See Parts II.B, III.
182. Compare Baczynska & Croft, supra note 136 with, e.g., Glen Kessler, History Lesson: When the
United States Looked the Other Way on Chemical Weapons, THE WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 4, 2013) available
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nature of what the Geneva Protocol and the CWC require when there is a
183
breach. The CWC allows nations to take the “necessary measures” to ensure
compliance, but does not specify beyond that, allowing nations to substitute
184
national aims for international action.
One solution to this problem is to create more specific examples of
consequences for violating the chemical weapons prohibition, tying the level of
185
the violation to the international action.
Use of a level one chemical, for example, would be a serious infraction, and
could lead to economic sanctions or military intervention, along with the disposal
186
requirements already in place under the CWC. While still allowing for final
decisions to be made by the Security Council or General Assembly of the U.N.,
specifying the types of international responses likely to result from a violation of
each level of the prohibition would create more certainty and uniformity in the
application of the prohibition and would discourage nations from ignoring
187
violations for political reasons.
Of course, none of these modifications to the CWC would have the power to
188
bind any nation that is not already a party to the CWC. This does not mean,
however, that a state that is not a party to either agreement can use chemical
189
weapons with unchecked impunity. Under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations, the Security Council has the power to act on any threats it
determines to be a breach of the peace, and is authorized to make decisions
190
regarding what methods to use combating such threats. Arguably the use of
chemical weapons, as defined by the international community would fall under a
breach of the peace, and with more definite parameters for enforcement, it may
be easier to convince the Security Council to act.
Additionally, though the Geneva Protocol’s specified prohibitions fall short
of those this Comment proposes, they are customary international law, and
therefore, a non-party state that uses chemical weapons might be subject to
reprisals under the Geneva Protocol, despite never specifically assenting to its
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/factchecker/wp/2013/09/04/history-lesson-when-the-united-stateslooked-the-other-way-onchemical-weapons/.
183. Geneva Protocol, supra note 7; CWC, supra note 17, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 (1993), 1974
U.N.T.S. 45, art. XII.
184. CWC, supra note 17, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 (1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45, art XII.
185. See supra Part V.A.
186. These actions are currently possible under the CWC, but not specified, and therefore easier to avoid
for political reasons. CWC, supra note 17, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21 (1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45, art. XII. See
supra Part V.A, for a discussion on what constitutes a level one chemical weapon.
187. The CWC already provides for U.N. intervention, but a clarification of the likely results of a
violation would improve the ability to enforce the agreement. CWC, supra note 17, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21
(1993), 1974 U.N.T.S. 45 art. XII.
188. Vienna Convention, supra note 175, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/11/Add.2, Part III, sec. 4, art. 34 .
189. U.N. Charter ch. VII, art. 39. The Geneva Protocol is generally considered customary international
law, and therefore binding on all states. Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 7, at 853.
190. U.N. Charter ch. VII, art. 39.
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provisions. While the specific proposed provisions in this Comment would not
apply in a situation where a state was party to neither agreement—or even where
a state was only a signatory of the Geneva Protocol—having a defined concept of
an appropriate response under the proposed clarifications could help direct the
international community’s response in situations where the legal standing is less
192
clear, or where chemical weapons are used by a non-state actor.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ambiguity is nothing new in chemical weapons agreements, nor is a lack of
193
clearly defined enforcement mechanisms.
The Geneva Protocol—now
considered customary international law—was born out of the anxieties of post194
World War I Europe. There was a fear that, “Unless [chemical weapons
development was] checked, [Europe would] find nations working on diverging
195
lines of protective and aggressive chemical warfare.” A broad definition of
“chemical weapons” would have helped further that cause by including the
196
known weapons of World War I with any new weapons that could be invented.
While that ambiguity makes it possible to bring in international organizations
197
to coordinate the removal and destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons and to
198
charge a jealous wife with using chemicals against her rival, this does not
necessarily mean the treaty is stronger or easier to enforce because its ambiguity
allows both readings. In fact, widening the possible applications of the treaty may
actually weaken the most powerful enforcement mechanism of any chemical
weapons treaty: the perception of chemical weapons as rare and uniquely heinous
199
instruments of war that must be avoided by civilized nations.

191. See Baxter & Buergenthal, supra note 7, at 853. This issue did not arise with Syria because, although
not a party to the CWC prior to the attacks on Ghouta, Syria was a signatory to the Geneva Protocol. S.C. Res.
2118, U.N. Doc, S/RES/2118 (Sept. 27, 2013).
192. Vienna Convention, supra note 175 , U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/11/Add.2, Part III, sec. 4, art. 34. For
guidance on how to interpret the Geneva Protocol, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that
treaties should be read in context with subsequent agreements between the parties. Id. While, again, this would
not absolutely control the actions of signatory states dealing with non-signatory states, the agreements between
signatory states as to how they will deal with each other could suggest possible solutions to dealing with third
party violators. See id.
193. See Hague IV, supra note 38. See also Geneva Protocol, supra note 7.
194. Geneva Protocol, supra note 7.
195. Lefebure, supra note 51, at 156.
196. See id. at 157.
197. Chemical Arms Watchdog Adopts Syria Stockpile Plan, BBC NEWS (Nov. 15, 2013, 4:33 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24966482.
198. Richey, supra note 14.
199. See Reisman, supra note 86 at 468–69. Reisman discusses a number of myths surrounding the use of
chemical weapons, challenging the idea that they are especially cruel or unusual. Id. Despite concluding that
general compliance with chemical weapons treaties is a myth, Reisman’s discussion of these “myths” suggests a
prevailing attitude about chemical weapons that helps explain why treaties with relatively weak explicit
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Because compliance with chemical weapons treaties has always depended on
the societal “othering” of chemical weapons—the notion that chemical weapons
are especially dangerous and immoral—applying the prohibitions in the treaty
too often has the potential to be as detrimental to compliance as applying it too
infrequently, because over-application dilutes the special nature of chemical
200
201
weapons. Without this special nature, chemical weapons become mundane.
Because the legal enforcement mechanisms are weak and dependent on this longstanding fear, making the treaty applicable to more infractions has the inverse
effect of making it more difficult to enforce by diluting the moral outrage against
202
chemical warfare. On the other hand, under-enforcement of the treaty could
lead to rogue states turning to chemical weapons as a means of increasing their
position of power within the international community or as a method of
203
controlling their populace. By allowing acts that should fall within the
prohibited category of the treaty to pass unaddressed, the likelihood of more
attacks like the ones in Syria could increase.
The Geneva Protocol and its progeny have never been, on their own, terribly
204
strong or effective international law. Instead, it is the fear of the unique
character of chemical weapons as particularly inhumane and “uncivilized,”
combined with a concern about retaliation, that has fostered general international
compliance—with a few notable exceptions—to the prohibition on chemical
205
weapons. The vague nature of the treaties’ definitions of chemical weapons,
combined with the lack of any cognizable enforcement mechanism, and a lack of
historical precedent for enforcement methods, leads to the dual threat of underenforcement—creating an atmosphere where the events in Syria can take place—
and over-enforcement—leading to a case like Bond that threatens to dilute the
206
only real strength of the treaties: the rare nature of chemical weapons use. The
way to remedy these concerns is by clarifying what does and does not qualify as
207
a chemical weapon, and what the consequences of lack of compliance are.

enforcement mechanisms still draw such international outrage and attention when they are violated. See
generally id.
200. Price, supra note 52, at 96.
201. See Reisman supra note 86, at 470.
202. Price, supra note 52, at 77–78.
203. See Reisman, supra note 86, at 470.
204. See supra Parts II & III.
205. See supra Parts II & III.
206. See supra Part IV.
207. See supra Part V.
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